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1.  Introduction 
This paper compares and contrasts the food security of two distinct geographical regions, 
namely the Middle East (sometimes referred to as Near Asia or West Asia) and North Africa 
(MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa. Since the global food price shock of 2007/08 and in light 
of predictions that global food prices are likely to remain both high and volatile for the 
foreseeable future (Oxfam 2011), national food security strategies are being reappraised by 
both national governments and international organisations. In particular, the extent to which 
food imports should be relied upon to achieve a nation‟s food security is being critically 
reappraised, particularly in many of the MENA countries that are highly import dependent. 
The desire to rely less on global food markets has led to debate on more innovative strategies, 
including  land  acquisition  overseas  by  MENA  countries  and  the  potential  for  a  green 
revolution in sub-Saharan Africa. The aim of this paper is to review the food security status 
and  challenges  for  the  two  regions  and  to  present  a  comparative  analysis  of  potential 
strategies to improve food security in both regions. 
The next section provides a working definition of food security and sketches a taxonomy of 
strategies and policies that can be used to ensure food security. Section 3 presents data on the 
food security status of countries in the two regions and looks at the extent to which they have 
relied on trade and domestic production as routes to food security. Section 4 discusses the 
food price shock of 2007/08, its impact on the two regions and the way in which it has caused 
a reappraisal of strategy, particularly in MENA. Section 5 looks at alternative policies to 
ensure future food security in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa and argues that viable future 
policies differ considerably between the two regions. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Definitions and Strategies 
2.a. Definitions 
Food security can be achieved at two levels – national aggregate food security and individual 
food  security.  The  former  exists  when  a  nation  has  adequate  food  supplies  to  feed  its 
population, either via domestic production, food imports, food aid or some combination of 
these.  Individual  food  security  exists  when  all  individuals  in  a  country  have  access  to 
adequate  food.  National  food  security  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  individual  food 
security in  that a nation may  have adequate national  food supplies but  they may not  be 
accessible to all individuals – if for example they are tied up in centrally located national 
grain silos or if individuals cannot afford to buy food. In the past domestic policy makers in 
developing  countries  have  sometimes  focused  excessively  on  national  food  security  with 
strategies such as strategic grain reserves but have failed to achieve individual food security 
in their countries (for an example see Harrigan 2003 on Malawi). The focus on individual 
food security was strengthen by Amaytra Sen‟s famous analysis of famines (Sen 1981) in 
which he used the demand-side concept of “entitlements” to food. Sen argued that individuals 
need entitlements to food and this will depend, amongst other things, on their income and 
assets.  Hence,  there  can  be  individual  hunger  and  famine  even  when  food  supplies  are 
adequate. Sen‟s analysis showed that it is not just the supply side of food that is important but 
also demand side factors in ensuring individual food security. Another way of expressing the 
importance of both supply side and demand side factors is the “three As” – Availability of 
food, Accessibility of food and Affordability of food. Related to this is the definition of food 
security adopted by the World Food Summit in Rome in 1995 and now generally accepted by 
most international organisations as a working definition:   
“Food security exits when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life.”
2 
2.b. Strategies 
Traditionally there have been three basic ways that a country can achieve food security at the 
national level – via domestic production, commercial food imports, or food aid. A strategy 
                                                           
2 See www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm 3 
 
relying purely on the first option is synonymous with national food self-sufficiency and again, 
in the past, policy makers have sometimes wrongly confused food self-sufficiency with food 
security (Harrigan 2003, 2005).   But food self-sufficiency is only one route to food security 
and in reality most countries are forced to rely on a combination of domestic production and 
imports, sometimes supplemented by food aid.  
Figure 1 provides a taxonomy of strategies, and polices under each strategy, that can combine 
to make up a nation‟s approach to food security.  To the extent that a strategy of domestic 
production is adopted, a variety of both price and non-price polices can be used to promote 
domestic  food  production.  If  a  trade-based  strategy  of  food  imports  is  used  this  can  be 
supported by policies which promote the production of agricultural export crops to earn the 
foreign  exchange  necessary  for  food  imports  and/or  polices  which  develop  other  foreign 
exchange  earning  sectors  such  as  manufacturing  and  services.  Both  strategies  can  be 
supplemented  by  food  aid.    At  the  individual  level,  households  likewise  have  a  choice 
between own food production or livelihood diversification into other activities with income 
used to purchase food in domestic markets. This needs to be supplemented by adequate social 
safety net programmes for households and individuals who would otherwise remain food 
insecure. Such programmes include food for work, school feeding programmes, targeted food 
subsidies, direct cash transfers etc.    
As will be shown in the discussion in Section 5, there is considerable diversity in the extent to 
which MENA and sub-Saharan Africa rely on the different food security strategies outlined 
above.  In addition, the MENA response to the 2007/08 global food price shock has produced 
a fourth innovative strategy not represented in Figure 1, namely the practice of acquiring land 
overseas to directly source food requirements. 4 
 
Figure 1:  Food Security Strategies and Policies 
 
 
Source: Harrigan 2005 
 
3.  The Food Security Status of the Two Regions 
It is often argued that MENA is potentially one of the most food insecure regions in the world. 
This characterisation is based on the region‟s heavy reliance on food imports (IFPRI 2010a, 
Wilson and Bruins 2005, World Bank 2009). Using imports as an indicator of food insecurity, 
MENA does appear highly insecure in that it has the largest food deficit of any region in the 
world  in  terms  of  cereal  imports  as  a  proportion  of  domestic  consumption.  Most  Arab 
countries import at least 50 percent of food calories they consume (with a heavy consumption 
and  import  reliance  on  wheat).  As  a  result  MENA  countries  are  the  world‟s  largest  net 
importer of cereal. In 2007 their net import of cereal was 58 million metric tonnes (MT). On 
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this criterion sub-Saharan Africa appears far more food secure with net imports of only 27 
million MT (World Bank 2009 Figure 1.1). This is reinforced when we consider that in 2002 
Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) all featured in 
the world‟s top 20 per capita cereal importers, whilst Syria is the only MENA country to have 
produced a fairly regular cereal surplus over the past 40 years (World Bank 2009). 
However, food imports are only one dimension of food security and relate to the macro level 
of national food security from a supply side perspective. Other variables that help determine a 
region‟s food security status include wealth levels, income distribution, and fiscal position. 
These variables differ not only between regions but also between nations. The joint World 
Bank/IFAD/FAO report on improving food security in Arab countries (World Bank 2009) 
argues that food security is partly determined by resource endowments which affect the level 
of food import requirements and also by fiscal balance which influences a country‟s ability to 
afford food imports. Using these  variables the  report produces  a scatter diagramme with 
cereal import dependency on the vertical axis and fiscal position on the horizontal axis. This 
is reproduced as Figure 2. As can be seen from Figure 2 there is considerable variability 
between different MENA countries. No country falls in the least vulnerable quadrant whilst 
most of the GCC countries along with  Oman,  Libya and  Iraq have a high cereal import 
dependency but are fiscally sound. This means that they are not particularly vulnerable to 
global food price shocks as due to their natural resource base, predominantly oil, they have a 
sound  fiscal  position  and  can  afford  food  imports.  This  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that 
traditionally global food prices and oil prices move together (World Bank 2009). Their high 
import  dependence  however  makes  them  vulnerable  to  quantity  shocks  such  as  trade 
embargoes  or  export  bans  by  food  exporting  countries.  Egypt,  Sudan  and  Syria  are  less 
dependent on cereal imports as they have a strong food production base, but they are fiscally 
strained making them vulnerable to global price shocks. The most vulnerable group are those 
countries  that  are  both  highly  import  dependent  and  fiscally  strained,  namely,  Jordan, 
Lebanon, Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco and Djibouti.  6 
 
Figure 2: Arab Countries Cereal Import Dependency and Fiscal Position (2007 fiscal balance 
and 2005 cereal imports/total cereal consumption) 
Figure 2:  Arab Countries  Cereal  Import Dependency and  Fiscal  Balance (2007 fiscal 
balance as % GDP, 2005 net cereal imports : total cereal consumption)  
 
   





Source: World Bank 2009 Figure 2.4 
 
Figure  3:  Net  Food  Imports  and  Fiscal  Balance  by  sub-Saharan  Country,  2005 
 
Source: FAO, IMF 2009: 80 




































Figure  3  shows  a  similar  scatter  diagramme  for  sub-Saharan  countries  (with  the  axes 
reversed).  Compared  to  the  MENA  countries,  many  of  the  sub-Saharan  countries  are 
clustered around the centre of the diagramme, indicating that there are fewer extremes in sub-
Saharan Africa particularly in terms of reliance on food imports.    
Wilson and Bruins (2005) create a macro level Food Security Index (FSI) for nine Middle 
Eastern  countries  based  on  three  variables:  1)  food  aid  as  a  percentage  of  domestic 
consumption, 2) imports as a percentage of domestic consumption, 3) country income levels. 
Each variable is given a score of between 50 and -40 with 50 being the most food insecure. 
The variables are then combined to produce a single FSI which is used as a basis to classify 
each  country.  The  data  are  reproduced  in  Table  1.  Again,  the  data  in  Table  1  shows 
considerable  variation  in  the  food  security  status  of  the  nine  countries,  with  the  GCC 
countries the most food secure - despite the fact that they have a heavy reliance on food 
imports they have high levels of wealth and do not need food aid. Jordan and Palestine are the 
two most food insecure countries in the sample – both have low income levels and are food 
aid and import dependent. From their analysis Wilson and Bruins conclude that food security 
in the Middle East seems to depend more on wealth levels than on climate. But as Lofgren 
and Richards (2003) point out, high income countries in the MENA region only account for 
about 10 percent of the region‟s population with low and middle income countries accounting 
for around 90 percent
3.  
 
                                                           
3 Other authors have produced different taxonomies of MENA countries using different food security indicators. 
For example Diaz-Bonilla et al (2000) produce country rankings by combining food production per capita, the 
ratio between total export earnings and food imports, calories and protein per capita and the non-agricultural 
population share. Their taxonomy only classifies Sudan and Yemen as food insecure and they conclude that 
trade stress i.e. a high ratio of food imports to export earnings tends to contribute more to food insecurity in the 
MENA region than in other regions. IFPRI (2010a) produces a taxonomy using the ratio of total exports to food 
imports, food production per capita, wealth levels and the Global Hunger Index. According to this 13 MENA 
countries are classified as food security challenged whilst the GCC countries along with Iran are classified as 
food secure.  8 
 
Table 1: Food Security Index Scores for 9 Middle Eastern Countries  
 
Source: Wilson and Bruins 2005 Table 7. 
 
The above measures of food security have  focused on macro level  variables.   However, 
although macro variables are important determinants of national aggregate food security, as 
argued in section 2, individual or household food security is a more meaningful concept. One 
internationally accepted measure that captures the individual dimensions of food security is 
the Global Hunger Index (GHI).  This is a multidimensional approach to measuring hunger 
combining  three  equally  weighted  indicators  1)  the  proportion  of  undernourished  as  a 
percentage of population, 2) the prevalence of underweight children younger than five, 3) the 
mortality rate of children younger than five
4. 
Table 2 provides GHI data for MENA, sub-Saharan Africa and the world. As can be seen, 
according to the GHI sub-Saharan Africa is far more food insecure than MENA with a GHI 
of 22.1 in 2009 (values between 22.0-29.9 are classified as alarming) as compared to 5.2 for 
MENA (values between 5.0-9.9 are classified as moderate hunger).   
 
                                                           
4 This index ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being the worst score. 9 
 
Table 2: Global Hunger Indices 
Region  % 
undernourished 











Under  5 
mortality 
1990 








31.0  28.5  27.4  23.4  17.7  14.3  25.4  22.1 
MENA  3.8  4.6  12.2  7.9  7.0  3.0  7.7  5.2 
World  19.7  16.1  30.4  22.7  9.8  6.8  20.0  15.2 
      Source: von Grebmer et al 2009 (in IFPRI 2010b) 
 
The  most  up  to  date  figures  for  levels  of  undernourishment  also  show  a  sharp  contrast 
between the two regions. In sub-Saharan Africa 239 million were undernourished in 2010, 
compared to 37 million in the MENA region, 19 million in developed countries and 578 
million in Asia and the Pacific (FAO 2010).
 5 In sub-Saharan Africa this was 28.5 percent of 
the population in 2003-05, the highest regional proportion (although there is a high degree of 
variability across countries) compared to only 4.6 percent of the population in MENA (Table 
2). However, although MENA fares much better than sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the 
absolute number and percentage of the population undernourished, one alarming feature that 
emerges from regional comparisons of components of the GHI is that MENA is the only 
region for which the indicator has worsened over the past two decades – between 1990/92-
2003/05  the  proportion  of  undernourished  increased  in  MENA  from  3.8  percent  to  4.6 
percent. By contrast in sub-Saharan Africa there was a trend decline from 31 percent in 1990-
92 to 28.5 percent in 2008. More recently, for both regions the impact of the 2007/08 global 
rise in food prices has resulted in an increase in the number of undernourished people – rising 
to  32  percent  in  2009  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  adding  an  extra  4  million  to  the 
undernourished in Arab countries (World Bank 2009). 
                                                           
5 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) refers to 45 countries 
(http://www.uis.unesco.org/profiles/EN/EDU/countries40350.html) 10 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide a combination of macro and individual level data relevant to food 
security for countries in the MENA region (Table 3) and the sub-Saharan region (Table 4).   
  
Table 3: Macro and Individual Food Security Indicators for MENA Countries 
 
    Source: IFPRI 2010a, Table 2. 
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Table 4: Food Security Status and Food Trade Patterns by sub-Saharan Africa Country 
Country*  Food security status  
2003-2008 
Net food imports  









ed  (FAO 
2010) 
Total  (FAO 
2005) 
Per  capita 
(UNFPA 
2005) 
DRC  41  69  271678  4725    F 
Burundi  38.3  62  16173  2156  y  F 
Eritrea  35.7  64  114271  25971    F 
Chad  30.9  37  3930  405  y  oil 
Ethiopia  29.8  41  90190  1165  y  L 
Sierra Leone  28.9  35  111131  20206    F 
Madagascar  27.5  25  -42225  -2270    L 
Central African Republic  27.4  40  8504  2126  y  F 
Angola  27.2  41  650666  40922    oil 
Niger  25.9  20  29477  2106  y  L 
Zambia  24.9  43  -56157  -4800  y  L 
Liberia  24.3  33  95947  29075    F 
Mozambique  23.7  38  187031  9446    L 
Rwanda  23.1  34  -4388  -488  y  L 
Guinea-Bissau  22.6    -29819  -18637    F 
Togo  22.4  30  18312  3002    F 
Burkina Faso  21.1  9  54229  4108  y  L 
Zimbabwe  20.9  30  183125  14087  y  F 
Tanzania  20.7  34  -28516  -745    L 
Kenya  19.8  31  -608195  -17732    L 
Mali  19.1  12  24619  1824  y  L 
Gambia  18.5  19  112174  74783    F 
Malawi  18.2  28  -58661  -4547  y  L 
Nigeria  17.8  6  1391167  10579    oil 
Cameroon  17.6  21  -65987  -4048    oil 
Benin  17.1  12  277586  33046    L 
Guinea  17.1  17  104527  11120    F 
Senegal  16.8  17  593053  50688    L 
Congo  15.2  15  178522  44631    oil 
Uganda  15  21  -1384  -48  y  L 12 
 
Côte d'Ivoire  14  14  -2281747  -125371    F 
Namibia  13.6  19  -51149  -25575    M 
Mauritania  13.1  7  219316  70747    - 
Botswana  12.5  25  36697  20387  y  M 
Lesotho  12.2  14  44251  24584  y  M 
Swaziland  10.8  18  -207381  -207381  y  M 
Ghana  10  5  -583773  -26415    L 
South Africa  7.3    -680005  -14346    M 
Mauritius  6.7  5  -72895  -60746    M 
Gabon  6.4    173686  124061    oil 
* The countries shown are those for whom there was data for at least one food security index 
and trade data. ** Oil = oil exporting countries; M = middle income countries; L = low 
income countries; F = fragile countries. 
Sources: FAO 2005, 2010; UNFPA 2005; IFPRI 2010b. 
 
Analysis of Tables 3 and 4 reveals some interesting facts of relevance to the discussion on 
viable  food  security  strategies  in  section  5  which  follows.    In  sub-Saharan  Africa  when 
countries  are  ranked  according  to  their  GHI  there  is  no  clear  relationship  between  food 
security status and net food imports per capita. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 4. What is 
apparent is that as the GHI rating declines (i.e. a country becomes more food secure) there is 
a greater degree of variance in the food trade balance with both large surpluses (Mauritius, 
South Africa, Ghana) and deficits (Gabon, Mauritania) arising. This can be expected as a 
greater degree of food security is associated with a larger economy and therefore greater 
levels of trade. For the MENA countries the most food secure countries in terms of the GHI 
and other indicators tend to be the GCC countries which are heavily reliant on trade in the 
form of food imports. Hence, trade seems to be a critical factor in influencing food security
6. 
Another factor that seems to have a bearing on food security is national income levels. Table 
4 shows that for the sub-Saharan countries the IMF categorisation in terms of income status is 
related to food security status. The fragile economies and low income countries  are the most 
food insecure, whereas the middle income countries tend to be the least food insecure. 
Likewise, Table 3 shows that those countries classified as food secure in MENA (with the 
exception of Iran) have the highest levels of GNI per capita.  
                                                           
6 This conclusion contrasts with the view that MENA should be classified as food insecure due to its heavy 
dependence on food imports (World Bank 2009, Wilson and Bruins 2005, IFPRI 2010a). 13 
 
Figure 4: Sub-Saharan Countries Global Hunger Index (2010) and Net Food Imports per 
Capita (2005) 
 
Source: UNFPA 2005; FAO 2005; IFPRI 2010b. 
 
Resource endowment does not seem to be correlated with food security in either region. 
There is no clustering of oil economies by food security status in sub-Saharan Africa whilst 
for MENA although all the food secure countries  are classified as mineral resource rich, 
there are almost as many countries (six) that are also mineral resource rich but food security 
challenged (Table 3)
7. 
The above economic analysis suggests that two factors may be critical in influencing a 
country‟s food security – the ability to generate sustained economic growth in order to raise 
income  levels  and  the  ability  to  increase  the  economy‟s  level  of  trade
8.  In terms of the 
taxonomy of food security strategies presented in Section 2, it would seem that the trade -
based approach can be as successful if not more successful than an emphasis on domestic 
production and self-sufficiency. However, the data on which this analysis is based is largely 
taken from the period before the 2007/08 global hike in food prices and also takes a 
                                                           
7 Also noteworthy is the fact that Table 4 does not show any clustering of landlocked countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa by food security status.  
8 This growth and increased globalisation via trade must also be of a pro-poor nature if individual as well as 
national food security is to be enhanced. 14 
 
predominantly economic approach to the issue of food security. As the next section will 
argue, the recent increase in global food prices has had a significant impact on countries in 
both regions, and particularly in the MENA region has led to a reappraisal of food security 
strategies, not just from an economic, but also from a political perspective. 
 
4.  The Food Price Shock of 2007/08 and Beyond 
2007 and first half of 2008 witnessed a sharp rise in global food prices (See Figure 5) and 
other  agricultural  commodity  prices  which  triggered  concerns  about  food  security, 
malnutrition and poverty in the MENA and sub-Saharan regions, as well as elsewhere.  
 
Figure 5: FAO Food Price Index 
 
Source: FAO website 
 
Falling  energy  and  commodity  prices  and  a  weakening  global  economy  meant  that  food 
prices fell back in late 2008, but again peaked in early 2011. In the last ten years to 2010 food 
prices  have  risen  overall  by  an  average  greater  than  80  percent.  Forecasts  suggest  that 15 
 
underlying structural factors mean that prices are likely to remain volatile and are unlikely to 
fall back to their pre-crisis levels (Oxfam 2011). The World Bank has highlighted the risk of 
future food price shocks. In particular, due to the supply constraints discussed below, cereal 
price growth is projected to accelerate from 0.26 percent a year until 2030, to 0.82 percent a 
year between 2030 and 2050 (World Bank 2008, p.62). 
Structural factors underpinning high and volatile food prices relate to both demand side and 
supply side factors in global food markets. On the demand side, high population and income 
growth in areas such as China, India and the Gulf States adds pressure to global markets. 
Changing food consumption patterns towards meat, particularly in emerging markets, means 
that 30 percent of world grain now goes to feed animals, even though an acre of arable land 
can produce 63 kilos of protein from grain but only 9 kilos of protein from beef. Added to 
this is biofuel demand for land and crops, particularly in the USA which accounts for 28 
percent of world cereal exports (Fabiosa et al 2008). On the supply side, there has been a 
decline  in  the  global  productivity  growth  rate  for  major  cereals.  One  factor  contributing 
towards  this  has  been  climate  change  (Cline  2007)  causing  natural  disasters  in  major 
producers of food, such as the 2010 floods in Australia. One result has been limited global 
stocks of food especially in OECD countries compared to high levels of 1980s and 1990s 
(Gardner and Sumner 2007). In times of shortage exporters are increasingly imposing export 
restrictions or bans. For example, during 2007/08 India and Egypt restricted their rice exports, 
and wheat export and other grain exports were banned by Russia, Ukraine, Argentina and 
Kazakhstan.  
The  thinness  of  global  food  markets  i.e.  the  fact  that  only  a  small  proportion  of  global 
production enters international markets via trade, means that demand and supply shocks are 
amplified in terms of their impact on prices in international markets. This has been worsened 
by high oil prices since oil is an important input to fertilisers, pesticides and fuel for tractors 
and machinery and also affects the transport costs of food. The impact on global food prices 
has been made worse by financial trading in agricultural commodities which has increased 
dramatically in recent years. In 2008 US$150 billion was invested in index and other funds 
for agricultural commodities compared to only US$15 billion in 2004 (Foresight 2011). This 
financial speculation can push prices up and also cause volatility.  16 
 
The  food  price  shock  of  2007/08  had  several  adverse  impacts  on  Arab  countries.  It  is 
estimated  that  the  shock  led  to  an  additional  4  million  undernourished  people  in  Arab 
countries (World Bank 2009). It also contributed to poverty, especially rural poverty. In the 
MENA region 5 percent of the population is classified as poor (below the lowest World Bank 
poverty line of US$1.25 per day), with 76 percent of them living in rural areas. The poor in 
the region spend between 35 percent – 65 percent of their income on food and were adversely 
affected by rising prices. In addition, there is a high concentration of people just above the 
poverty line in many MENA countries, which makes poverty very sensitive to even small 
increases in the cost of living, most notably in countries like in Egypt and Morocco (ESCWA 
2010). The rural landless, marginal farmers and the urban poor were the most affected groups. 
ESCWA (2010 Table 8) has estimated that the food price shock of 2007/08 created 2.19 
million new poor in six conflict affected MENA countries alone, namely, Egypt, Jordan, 
Palestine, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The effects of rising food prices on living standards in 
MENA led to political instability. Food riots and demonstrations in 2007 and 2008 against 
rising food prices occurred in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
and the wave of political unrest that swept the region in the first half of 2011 has been partly 
triggered by socioeconomic factors such as declining real wages, unemployment and rising 
food prices (Harrigan 2011). 
The food price shock also led to macroeconomic problems in Arab countries. Inflation in the 
MENA region increased more than twice the speed of world inflation in 2007/8 (IMF 2008). 
Countries that relied heavily on food imports but did not gain from higher oil prices, such as 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Djibouti, saw deterioration in their trade balance due to the 
higher  cost  of  food  imports.  Fiscal  pressures  also  mounted  due  to  the  existence  of  food 
subsidies –  as  imported food prices  rose it cost  more to  keep domestic consumer prices 
constant via subsidies. Countries like Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Yemen increased public sector 
wages, increased bread subsidies and increased direct cash transfers to try to cushion the 
impact. In addition to the food price shock, the current global financial crisis means that some 
MENA countries with limited financial resources are finding it difficult to get credit from 
international  food  companies  and  food  exporting  countries  to  finance  their  food  import 
requirements. 
The effects of the global food price increases in sub-Saharan Africa has been more varied by 
country due to the country specific variability in the extent to which reliance is made on food 17 
 
imports. To understand the linkage between food prices, food security and poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa also requires an assessment of income sources, the ratio of net food buyers to 
sellers, and the change in food prices relative to other expenditures.  Anderson (2004, p.18) 
argues that food price rises (through trade liberalisation) have the potential to benefit the 65 
percent of the rural Sub-Saharan Africa population who are farm households, although the 
extent to which they are net food sellers will influence this impact (IFPRI 2004; World Bank 
2008). There is also potential for a wage rise for landless farm labourers as a result of rising 
food prices.  
As will be shown in the next section, the current high levels of global food prices have caused 
many policy makers to reappraise the extent to which they rely on a trade-based food security 
strategy, and this reappraisal has been particularly pronounced in the MENA region. This 
reappraisal is occurring despite the fact, as argued in Section 3, that high levels of trade seem 
to be associated with food security.  
 
5.  Food Security Strategies in the Two Regions 
5.a. Trade-based strategies 
5.a.i. MENA 
During the 1970s a large food gap emerged in the MENA region, with food demand rapidly 
outpacing domestic food production leading to increased reliance on food imports. This was 
due to rapid income and population growth during the oil boom years of the 1970s as well as 
a  neglect  of  the  domestic  agricultural  sector.  Rapid  population  growth  was  particularly 
marked  in  the  GCC  states  such  as  UAE,  Kuwait  and  Saudi,  with  the  former  seeing  the 
world‟s largest population growth - between 1961-2002 an increase of 2,897 percent. These 
countries, along with Jordan, were in the world‟s top ten countries for population growth. As 
a result over the past 40 years there has been a large increase in food imports to the MENA 
region.  
The  increased  reliance  on  food  imports  to  achieve  food  security  in  the  region  meant 
dependence on global food markets and this made countries in MENA vulnerable to global 
food price shocks and disruptions in global supply. Mindful of this fact, policy makers in the 18 
 
region, especially in some of the oil rich states, embarked on programmes of domestic food 
production. Many countries began to support domestic production of cereals by subsidising  
inputs, protecting farmers against imports, building massive irrigation projects and buying 
crops at excessively high prices. Jordan, Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia launched such 
policies  in  the  1970s  followed  later  by  Kuwait  and  UAE.  The  cost,  however,  in  both 
ecological and economic terms, was high. Domestic subsidies in the form of price support 
had to be offered to domestic farmers since their production costs far exceeded international 
prices. For example, at the end of the 1980s Moroccan cereal farmers were paid prices 180 
percent  above  world  prices,  Syrian  maize  farmers  in  the  mid-1980s  received  prices  100 
percent above world prices and Saudi wheat farmers in the early 1980s received prices 600 – 
1000 percent above world prices (Weinbaum 1984, Wilson and Bruins 2005). 
The most notable country in terms of this drive towards increased domestic food production 
was Saudi Arabia. Massive irrigation projects were launched in the Saudi desert in the 1970s 
and 80s to support grain and dairy farmers. Loans to farmers rose from US$5 million in 1971 
to US$1 billion in 1983 and the country spent US$2.12 billion on farm subsidies between 
1978-1992. As a result wheat output in Saudi rose from 3,300 MT in 1978 to 3.9 million MT 
in 1992. Not only did Saudi achieve food self-sufficiency in cereals she temporarily became 
the world‟s sixth largest wheat exporter. 
 
The collapse in oil prices in the 1980s meant that the drive towards domestic food production 
could not be sustained in the region and policy makers as well as international organisations 
accepted that food imports would continue to remain an important component of the region‟s 
food security strategy.  It is predicted that for Arab countries (excluding Sudan) dependence 
on food imports will increase by 64 percent in the next 20 years. The IFRPI IMPACT model 
(IFPRI  2008)  and  the  FOA  Food  Balance  Model  (FAO  2006a,  2008)  both  predict  that 
demand for food in the Arab world will grow substantially to 2030 and their food production 
will not keep pace, leading to increased reliance on food imports. All countries except Sudan 
are predicted to remain net cereal importers through to 2030 and the only country predicted to 
decrease its cereal imports is Morocco (by 17 percent). The country that is expected to have 
the greatest increase in  its cereal imports is  Egypt. Meat and milk consumption  are also 
predicted to rise in the region especially in the oil rich countries due to population increase 
and increasing incomes, leading to increased imports of these goods to GCC countries. 19 
 
The  predicted  increased  reliance  on  food  imports  is  due  on  the  demand  side  to  strong 
population growth, income growth and urbanisation. On the supply side, low agricultural 
productivity  growth  is  predicted for  the region. This  is  largely  due to factors  relating to 
natural resource endowments – projections show that by 2050 renewable water will fall to an 
average of 500 cubic meters per capita
9 and arable land to 0.12 hectares per capita  (World 
Bank 2009). Climate change  is also  predicted to  reduce water availability in MENA via 
reduced rainfall which will adversely affect both crop area and yields (Cline 2007). 
Most countries in the MENA region continue to protect their farming sector, with high levels 
of trade protection against certain imports to shield producers from cheaper competing 
imports (such as durum wheat farmers in most countries, milk and olive oil producers in 
Tunisia, sugar beet farmers in Syria and Lebanon). However, most international organisations, 
such as the World Bank, FAO, and IFPRI, as well as authors such as Lofgren  and Richards 
(2003) and Richards and Waterbury (2006)  are advocating agricultural liberalisation and a 
more trade-orientated approach to food security in the region.  The joint report of the  World 
Bank, FAO and IFPRI (World Bank 2009) states that the challenge facing the MENA region 
is “to find the best ways to improve food security, whilst recognising that there will be a 
continued  and  increasing  dependence  on  imports.”      This  is  echoed  in  the  2008  World 
Development Report (World Bank 2008).  
 
An increased reliance on a trade-based  food security strategy has  implications  for future 
resource  allocation  in  the  MENA  region.  Within  the  agricultural  sector,  international 
organisations are advocating a shift away from domestic cereal, dairy and meat production 
towards production of tree crops, vegetables, fruit and semi-arid crops, which make more 
efficient use of water and which can be partly destined for export markets. This is based on 
the  need  to  save  scarce  water  and  maximise  the  returns  to  water  use
10.  Hence, within 
agriculture the policy advice is to shift away from water intensive food crops towards more 
water efficient agricultural exports ,  with the foreign exchange earned from such exports 
helping to fund a higher level of food imports. This type of approach is sometimes known as 
                                                           
9 Jordan already has annual renewable water resources of less than 150 cubic meters per capita making it one of 
the most water scarce countries in the world. 
10 Vegetable production yields six times more value added per drop of water than wheat production, and ten 
times more than beef. Yet in the Maghreb 40 percent of irrigated land is devoted to cereal, 51 percent in the 
Mashreq and 73 percent in GCC. 20 
 
Virtual Water Trade (Allan 1998) – whereby water scarce countries should import water 
intensive  goods.  However,  due  to  distortions  in  water  scarce  countries  such  as  trade 
protection, price supports, subsidized credit, energy and water subsidies which encourage 
excess water use for irrigation, water scarcity currently plays only a small role in determining 
global trade patterns.  
One  policy  implication  of  the  trade-based  approach  to  food  security  in  the  region  via 
international  trade  in  agricultural  products  is  the  need  to  open  up  global  markets  and 
liberalise  trade  in  agricultural  commodities.  MENA  relies  heavily  on  European  Union 
markets for the export of its agricultural produce yet these markets remain highly protected. 
DeRosa (1995) argues that non-discriminatory agricultural trade liberalisation will improve 
food security in MENA and IFPRI (2010a) notes that trade liberalisation will result in lower 
production and more imports of wheat for MENA, but higher production and more exports of 
fruits and vegetables.  
In addition to changing the structure of agriculture towards export crops, another strategy is 
export diversification into industrial and manufactures for export in order to earn foreign 
currency to  import food. This  should form  part of any sensible strategy  since ecological 
constraints in the MENA region limit the potential of agriculture
11. As a result of constraints to 
agricultural production, the agricultural sector in MENA contributes only 12 percent to the 
region‟s GDP yet uses over 80 percent of water as compared to 4 percent used by industry 
(IFPRI 2010a, Table 5). The extent to which countries will need to rely on sectors other than 
agriculture to help achieve food security varies, particularly according to their availability of 
water resources. 
Reliance on non-agricultural exports as a route to food security via food imports requires both 
an expansion and diversification of exports from the region. IFPRI (2010a) argues that a 
commonly used measure of food security at the macro level is the ratio of total exports to 
food imports. This ratio is low for MENA. In addition, the fact that the region‟s exports are 
concentrated, with approximately 70 percent of the region‟s export earnings coming from oil, 
exposes the region to food security risks via fluctuations in oil prices. Over the past two 
                                                           
11 83 percent of land in the Arab MENA receives less than 4 inches of rain annually and among these countries 
all but Syria, Sudan and Tunisia have over 50 percent of their land classified as desert, waste or urban (Wilson 
and Bruins 2005). 21 
 
decades manufacturing exports as percentage of total exports have been declining showing a 
lack of export diversification
12.  
Lofgren and Richards (2003) argue that in a trade -based food security strategy ,  labour-
intensive exports can play a crucial role, not only as a source of foreign exchange but also by 
boosting real wages of poor people.  Since the scope for increasing wages and employment in 
agriculture is limited they advocate a focus on manufacturing and to a lesser extent services 
to promote pro-poor labour-intensive export-orientated growth
13.  
 
5.a.ii Sub-Saharan Africa 
Comparing sub-Saharan Africa to the MENA region, several features are evident in terms of 
the reliance on food imports to achieve food security. Firstly, the sub-Saharan region is less 
reliant than MENA on food imports in absolute terms - in 2007 MENA‟s net import of cereal 
was 58 million MT compared to only 27 million MT for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 
2009, Figure 1.1). As a result domestic markets are a much more important source of food in 
sub-Saharan Africa with domestic markets (including the value of own consumption) for food 
staples worth US$49.7 billion in the region in 2000 (FAO 2003). However, there is still a 
heavy and increasing reliance on trade (particularly intra-regional trade) for achieving food 
security - only 20 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa‟s total calorie consumption was obtained 
from domestically produced rice, wheat, and maize in 2003 (i.e. produced within the country 
it is consumed in) (FAO 2006b). 
Secondly  there  is  far  more  country  variation  within  the  sub-Saharan  region,  with  some 
countries being large food importers and others being large food exporters. By country, the 
                                                           
12 In MENA manufacturing still only accounts for 13.4 percent of GDP whilst the service sector is dominated by 
domestic activities and public services rather than exports (IFPRI 2010a). Also, with the exception of Tunisia 
and Turkey, the share of manufactured goods in exports remains below the average for middle income countries 
(Lofgren and Richards 2003) and that this needs to be improved to help a trade-based food security strategy. 
13 Lofgren and Richards (2003) also argue that it is wrong to conflate national food security with food self -
sufficiency in drought prone countries which characterise the M ENA region since this wrongly assumes that 
domestic production is a less risky mode for satisfying domestic demand than is dependence on international 
trade. They argue that the empirical evidence shows that cuts in domestic grain supplies due to droughts  in 
MENA are far more significant than cuts in import supplies due to embargoes. 
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largest  net  food  importers  in  the  region  in  2004  were  Nigeria  (US$1,391m),  Angola 
(US$651m), and Senegal (US$593m). Conversely, the largest net food exporters were Ivory 
Coast (US$2,282m), South Africa (US$680m), Kenya (US$608m), and Ghana (US$584m) 
(FAO 2006a, p.141). By country the proportion of total calorie consumption obtained from 
domestically produced rice, wheat and maize also varies greatly, from 63 percent in Zambia 
to 12 percent in DRC (FAO 2006b).  
Thirdly, sub-Saharan Africa relies on intra-regional trade for much of its food security unlike 
MENA. For example, two thirds of the total regional demand for rice (19,580,000 MT in 
2008)  was  met  by  regional  production  (although  wheat  is  still  mainly  imported  with  97 
percent of total regional consumption of 12,192,000 MT in 2008 being imported). The trend 
for  all  developing  countries  has  been  for  increased  intra-regional  and  trade  with  other 
developing countries, and sub-Saharan Africa has experienced this trend in the agricultural 
sector. 
Taking agricultural trade more generally (not just food crops) over the long term the sub-
Saharan region has been a net agricultural exporter, although in 2004 the increase in the value 
of imports resulted in a trade deficit (see Figure 6). A characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the trend increase in its agricultural imports to agricultural GDP ratio as shown in Table 5. 
This is consistent with the increasing role for agricultural trade and a reduction in agricultural 
and food self-sufficiency in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Figure 6: Agricultural Imports and Exports of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: FAO (2006a, p.102). 23 
 
Table 5: Shares of Agricultural Trade in Agricultural GDP 
 
Source: Aksoy and Ng (2010, p.14) 
 
Although sub-Saharan Africa is much less reliant on food imports than MENA to achieve 
food security, like MENA the region has seen a growing food gap over the past four decades 
due to both demand side and supply side factors.  Factors affecting the pattern of demand for 
food and the  extent of  food insecurity  are  greatly influenced by demographics including 
population growth trends and urbanisation as well as income growth within the region.  
Between 1985 and 2003, the population of sub-Saharan Africa increased by 63 percent and 
between 1990 and 2003 the population growth rate for the region averaged more than 2.4 
percent per year (Staatz and Dembele 2008, p.17). Of this increasing population, a larger 
proportion is living in urban areas. Between 1985 and 2004 the number of people living in 
urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa had increased by 2.5 times, from 24 percent to 35 percent 
of the population (ibid, p.17). Club du Sahel (2000) noted that more than half of the region‟s 
population will be in urban areas by 2035. This trend is particularly pronounced in West 
Africa, the sub-region currently with the lowest extent of food insecurity, where 60 percent of 
the population is projected to be urban by 2020. 
Income  growth  and  increased  urbanisation  have  also  resulted  in  changing  consumption 
patterns  which  has  directly  affected  the  agricultural  sector.  Demand  for  more  processed 24 
 
products  has  increased  which  raises  the  scope  for  value  addition.  However  sub-Saharan 
African  producers  have  had  variable  success  in  taking  advantage  of  this  opportunity.  In 
addition, there has been a shift towards wheat and rice (which are net imports) and this has 
the potential to reduce demand for traditional staples. This has an impact on food prices, 
particularly  when  transport  costs  are  considered.  On  the  supply  side,  low  agricultural 
productivity in the region is a major constraint, as discussed in Section 5.c. below. 
The above analysis has shown that the MENA region is much more reliant on a trade-based 
food security strategy than sub-Saharan Africa, as shown by the former region‟s much larger 
food imports. In addition, in sub-Saharan Africa there is greater country variability in terms 
of  food  imports,  and  a  greater  reliance  on  both  domestic  and  regional  markets  for  food 
supplies.  However,  within  sub-Saharan  Africa  there  has  been  a  growing  food  gap  and  a 
resulting decline in food self-sufficiency and a corresponding greater reliance on agricultural 
trade.    
To the extent that both the MENA and sub-Saharan regions will have to rely increasingly on 
food imports to achieve food security there are a number of initiatives that countries in both 
regions could take to improve the effectiveness of the trade-based component of food security. 
The World Bank/IFAD/FAO report (World Bank 2009) suggests a number of ways in which 
MENA countries could reduce their exposure to international market and price volatility for 
imported foods. This includes: improving supply-chain efficiency to reduce cost and improve 
food distribution; developing virtual stockpiles of food for example via financial reserves and 
forward options rather than relying on physical stockpiles; and investing in infrastructure to 
store and transport food.  
As MENA countries are the single largest group of cereal importers there is potential for 
economies of scale via multinational procurement and MENA countries could do more to 
monitor world and regional cereal demand and supply to foresee price shocks. Linked to this 
is the need for better monitoring of national food demand and supply in MENA. The League 
of Arab States has proposed a regional food security and early warning system to help predict 
quantity  and  location  of  any  needed  assistance  and  this  could  work  with  established 
institutions that already monitor food supplies such as the FAO. 
Both MENA and sub-Saharan countries could make greater use of formal risk markets to 
insure transactions in global food markets and there is scope for countries to use financial 25 
 
instruments to create virtual stockpiles of food i.e. by using futures contracts and option 
contracts. They could also improve logistics to get imported food to consumers at lower 
prices. Gulf countries score highly on the World Bank logistics performance index, but below 
other upper income countries, but countries like Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Egypt 
score badly as do most sub-Saharan countries (World Bank 2007). 
 
5.b. Food aid 
In times of protracted crisis food aid may be required by a country in order to maintain 
individual food security for its population (FAO 2006a, p.32). Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
far more reliant on food aid than the MENA region. Wilson and Bruins (2005) look at nine 
Middle Eastern countries and find that between 1992-2002 six  received food aid, namely, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Israel and Palestine. However, over this period all reduced their 
dependence on food aid. By contrast  in 2006 24 of the 39 countries facing serious food 
shortages and in potential need of food aid were in Africa (FAO 2006a, p.85), with the main 
cause being civil strife and humanitarian displacement. 
Food aid is usually expressed in its wheat equivalent but it consists of grain, processed grain 
products, pulses, micronutrients and fortified products, as well as contributions of cash for the 
purchase  of  qualifying  products.  Of  sub-Saharan  cereal  consumption  of  63m  MT, 
approximately  9  percent  (5.8m  MT)  in  2004/05  was  provided  through  food  aid.
14 The 
quantity of food aid shipment is following a downward trend. Table 6 shows the patterns of 
food aid provision as a share of total food consumption by  sub-Saharan sub-region. The 
highest recipient of food aid was Eastern Africa, also where the GHI was highest, however 
Western Africa, the most food secure sub-region had a higher share of food aid than Central 
Africa, where some of the most food insecure countries are located. By individual country 
there is no clear trend between the Global Hunger Index rating and the provision of food aid
15, 
                                                           
14 The consumption data is only available for 2005.  
15 Considering individual countries within  sub-Saharan Africa: the Democratic Republic of Congo has the 
highest GHI rating for the region, yet its share of food aid of 1 percent of food consumption is comparable with 
that of Ghana‟s, one of the region‟s most food secure countries. 
 26 
 
suggesting that it cannot be relied upon as strategy and that there are other complex factors 
underpinning its provision, possibly along with data anomalies.  
 











Sub-Saharan Africa average  3.2        20.5 
Central    1.1        23.1       
East  6.7        25.7       
Southern  2.4        17.1       
West  3.7        19.2       
Source:  FAO  2010  http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-data/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/  IFPRI 
2010 
 
Analysis has shown that food aid, if not delivered appropriately, can damage local production 
and markets and in turn have a negative impact upon food security in  the long term.  In 
response  to  these  findings  CARE-USA  adjusted  their  food  aid  policy  to  strengthen  the 
management of local and regional purchases of food aid (FAO 2006a, p.23). 
In summary, sub-Saharan Africa has been much more reliant on food aid than MENA, but the 
impact of food aid on long term food security is debatable. 27 
 
5.c. Domestic food production in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa 
Due to regional differences in natural resource endowments and farming methods, there is 
more scope for the sub-Saharan region compared to MENA to focus on increased domestic 
food  production  as  a  source  of  future  food  security.  Table  7  shows  that  the  available 
agricultural land per capita in sub-Saharan Africa at 1.74 ha/per capita in 2006 significantly 
exceeds  that  in  MENA  at  1.11  ha/per  capita.    In  addition,  sub-Saharan  Africa  has  a 
substantially smaller irrigated area and lower fertiliser use than all other regions, including 
MENA. The Near East and North Africa region has almost eight times the proportion of 
irrigated  area  and  more  than  a  five  times  greater  usage  of  fertiliser.  These  comparisons 
indicate  that  sub-Saharan  Africa  has  far  greater  potential  than  MENA  to  increase  food 
production both extensively (expanding the area cultivated) and intensively (via productivity 
gains from more intense use of inputs such as irrigation and fertiliser).   
 
Table 7: Agricultural Area, Irrigation and Fertiliser use by Region 
Region  Agricultural 
area per capita 
(ha/pc) 
Irrigated  area  (% 
of  arable  and 
permanent  crops 
area) 
Fertiliser  use 
(kg/ha  of 
arable land) 
Sub-Saharan Africa*  1.47  3.7  14.6 
Asia and the Pacific  0.31  33.7  171.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean   1.46  11.0  89.3 
Near East and North Africa  1.11  28.7  73.1 
Total world  0.80  18.0  100.8 
Total developed countries  1.34  10.6  82.6 
Total developing countries  0.66  23.0  114.3 
Source: FAO 2005, p. 179 * Excludes South Africa 
  
The fact that sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest global application of nutrients to the soil 
(Foresight 2011, p.133) is reflected in average cereal yields for the region, which are a third 
to a half of those of other regions as shown in Table 8. It is also reflected in value added per 
worker in agriculture. The value added per worker for the sub-Saharan region in 2003 was 28 
 
US$327 with an annual growth rate of 1.4 percent between 1992 and 2003. This is less than 
one sixth of that of the MENA region where the value added per worker was US$ 2140, with 
a faster growth rate of 2.4 percent (FAO 2005, p.178). 
 
Table 8: Cereal yields by region 
Region  Cereal yields kg/ha 
1992-1994  2002-2004 
Sub-Saharan Africa*  10054  10709 
Asia and the Pacific  30889  34590 
Latin America and the Caribbean   24563  30121 
Near East and North Africa**  19647  23609 
Total world  28002  31675 
Total developed countries  32087  38038 
Total developing countries  25518  28363 
Source: FAO 2005, p.154 
* Excludes South Africa 
** Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya 




Scope for sub-Saharan Africa to increase food crop productivity is shown in Figure 7. Whilst 
there is a high degree of diversity across sub-Saharan countries, overall there has been slow 
productivity growth in the agricultural sector (Christiaensen and Demery 2007; Byerlee et al. 
2005; Dercon et al 2006; Diao et al. 2006; Mwambu and Thorbecke 2004). The cereal yield 
growth for the region (Figure 7) shows an increase of just under 30 percent, whereas the 
increase for developing countries in Asia was 177 percent and Latin America 144 percent  
(Staatz and Dembele, 2008, p.8). 
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Figure 7: Cereal Yield Growth Rates by Region, 1960-2005 
 
Source: FAOSTAT cited in Staatz and Dembele (2008, p.8) 
 
Sub-Saharan  Africa‟s  inability  to  take  advantage  of  its  potential  for  both  extensive  and 
intensive  growth  of  domestic  food  crop  production  is  explained  by  a  number  of  factors, 
including supply inefficiencies which are due to inadequate investment in transport, irrigation 
and  storage  and  supply  infrastructure.    More  generally,  there  remains  a  high  degree  of 
variance in terms of access to resources (Jayne and Chapota 2006; Jayne et al. 2001; Weber 
et al. 1988; Zezza et al. 2006). 
Agricultural  productivity  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  has  been  constrained  by  both 
underinvestment and investment that has been inappropriately targeted, apparent from the 
high and variable rates of return.
16 Particularly notable is inappropriate investment related to 
poor project design and inadequate monitoring and evaluation (African Development Bank et 
al. 2006; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006; both cited in Staatz and Dembele 
2008). Weaknesses in the maintenance of existing infrastructure and expenditure upon import 
subsidies rather than productive investment have also been two notable characteristics (Staatz 
2008, p.9). Structural adjustment policies have resulted in decades of insufficient investment 
in infrastructure from  agricultural parastatals, networks of extension agents, and national 
agricultural research (Jayne et al. 2010). By country there are large variances in public sector 
                                                           
16 Economic rates of return were found to range from an average rate of 18 percent for foreign financed 
irrigation projects for twenty years since 1985 to a median rate of 34.3 percent for agricultural research projects 
(AfB et al. 2006, Alston et al. 2000 cited in Staatz and Dembele 2008: 9). 30 
 
expenditure on agriculture as shown in Figure 8, which has persisted despite the African 
Union (AU) pledge to direct 10 percent of public expenditure to agricultural development.
17  
 
Figure 8: Agricultural Expenditure as a Share of Total Spending by Country  
 
Source: Fan et al. 2009. 
 
 
Although sub-Saharan Africa has much greater potential for a food security strategy to rely 
on  domestic  food  crop  production  compared  to  MENA,  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
agricultural sector in MENA should be ignored. I nternational organisations (World Bank 
2009) have advocated increased agricultural productivity as one part of a three pronged 
strategy to  improving food security in MENA (along with strengthening domestic safety nets, 
family  planning  and  education  and  reducing  vulnerability  to  international  food  mar ket 
volatility in the ways suggested in section 5.a.ii above). 
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In both MENA and sub-Saharan Africa improving agricultural productivity (not just in food 
crop production) will contribute to food security in three ways: it will increase the purchasing 
power of the rural poor via higher incomes from increased productivity enabling them to buy 
food; it will increase foreign exchange earnings via increased agricultural exports of crops in 
which the regions  have comparative advantage so providing foreign exchange to purchase 
food imports; and it will increase domestic production of food and hence reduce need for 
imports. An increase in the purchasing power of the rural poor is particularly needed in sub-
Saharan  Africa  where  it  is  estimated  that  42.3  percent  of  the  population  will  remain  in 
poverty by 2015 (IFPRI  2004).  The agricultural  sector is  an important  factor in  overall 
economic growth and poverty reduction and therefore productivity growth in the sector plays 
a key role (Christiaensen and Demery 2007, Byerlee et al. 2005, Dercon et al 2006, Diao et al. 
2006, Mwambu and Thorbecke 2004). The relationship between the agricultural sector and 
food  security,  through  the  poverty  reduction  transmission,  is  more  direct  than  for  other 
sectors. It has been estimated that a 10 percent increase in agricultural yields in Africa, is 
associated with a 7 percent reduction in poverty (World Bank 2008 cited in Foresight 2011, 
p.127). Therefore exploring the potential for a green revolution in Africa is crucial to both 
food security and poverty reduction.   
In MENA there is little scope to increase agricultural production extensively i.e. via increased 
use of resources like land and water that are already scare. Hence the region will need to rely 
on intensive increases i.e. productivity increases in terms of yields per unit of land and water. 
In the mid-1980s agricultural productivity in MENA started catching up with other net food 
importing developing regions, largely due to adoption of improved wheat and rice varieties in 
countries like Syria, Iran and Egypt. But more recently productivity growth is again lagging 
most other regions, except for in the production of fruits. As shown in Table 8, although 
cereal yields in MENA exceed those of sub-Saharan Africa , they are still well below the 
global average and this gap is widening. Between 1990-2007 cereal yields in the Arab world 
increased by 14.5 percent compared to global average of 21.5 percent. However, the scope 




5.d. A green revolution in sub-Saharan Africa? 
As argued above, in contrast to MENA, there is much more scope for a green revolution in 
food crop production, as well as agriculture more generally, in sub-Saharan Africa, and this 
could do much to improve food security. Staatz and Dembele (2008) argue that there is scope 
for faster growth in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa and in turn for an increase in domestic 
food production through a type of green revolution based on: i) changes in the global and 
regional socio-economic and political contexts; ii) increased willingness to support the sector 
as a basis for poverty reduction; and iii) lessons from some success stories in Africa. These 
opportunities must be balanced against the challenges faced by the current and future impacts 
of  HIV/AIDS,  population  growth  and  climate  change  upon  the  sector.  These  present 
challenges for the rural labour supply and at the same time place pressure on food, energy 
and water (Foresight 2011, p.127).  
The characteristics requiring consideration in an evaluation of both the absence of and scope 
for  a  green  revolution  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  include  population  density,  infrastructure, 
geography and ecology, fertilizer use and the soil quality, and agricultural sector policies. 
These will be discussed in turn and comparisons made to the situation in Asia at the time of 
its green revolution.  
On average the population density of sub-Saharan Africa is one tenth of that of South Asia, 
however the high extent of diversity in the region has resulted in some areas where a high 
density  of  population  has  prevented  further  expansion  of  agricultural  output  through 
increased  land  area  (e.g.  Rwanda).  Once  adjustments  are  made  for  land  quality,  the 
population density in Kenya is found to be higher than that of Bangladesh (World Bank, 2008, 
p. 55). Figure 9 shows how increasing land area has been the dominant strategy of  sub-
Saharan  Africa,  in  comparison  to  yield  increases  dominating  the  Asian  strategy.  Future 
expected trends in population growth in sub-Saharan Africa however increase the urgent need 
to address agricultural productivity.  33 
 
Figure 9: Cereal Production Expansion Strategies 
 
Source: FAO 2006a, cited in World Bank 2008, p. 55. 
 
The resource endowment of sub-Saharan Africa‟s agriculture is very different from Asia at 
the start of its green revolution. The main characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa‟s agriculture is 
that it is diverse in the range of staple crops that are produced with characteristic differences 
by sub-region. Asia was able to focus on improved varieties of rice and wheat and their 
irrigation, however in sub-Saharan Africa a variety of improved varieties are needed along 
with Africa-specific technologies. This presents an immediately greater challenge.
18  
Whilst some estimates show that applying existing technology could still have ben efits, 
increasing average yields by as much as three times in many parts of Africa (Foresight 2011, 
p.80),  sub-Saharan  African  agriculture  has  distinct  characteristics  requiring  specific 
technologies. These include: i) the diversity of staples; ii) a great er need for increased 
nutrients; iii) increased transport costs making ii more challenging; iv) a majority dependence 
on rain fed agriculture due to a low proportion of irrigated area (Table  7); v) low population 
density  which  raises  the per person infrast ructure  cost;  v i)  a  higher  proportion  of  the 
population residing in landlocked countries with higher transport costs (Collier 2006, World 
Bank 2007); and vii) higher research  costs due to lower economies  of scale to R&D 
                                                           
18 The third Asian green revolution crop was maize, in Africa this is only dominant in the South (Staatz and 
Dembele 2008, p.30).  
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compared to other regions as a result of the region‟s geography (Staatz and Dembele 2008, 
p.30). 
In particular the geography of the region and its impact upon transport costs, highlights the 
importance  of  domestic  food  production  as  a  strategy.  Faster  growth  is  dependent  upon 
greatly increased levels of investment in infrastructure, which are more efficient and targeted 
to areas where the growth payoffs are higher. Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced decades of 
insufficient investment in infrastructure which have resulted in greatly increased production 
costs and higher risk. Particularly notable is the low investment in roads, related to the lower 
population density and also in irrigation. These infrastructure shortfalls have a large potential 
to impact upon production costs, such that in landlocked countries transport costs can be as 
high  as  77  percent  of  the  value  of  their  exports  (Foresight,  2011,  p.85).  Furthermore, 
deficiencies in storage and supply infrastructure can have a large impact on the food supply 
chain. Post-harvest losses for maize in parts of Africa, can be as high at 30 percent, and not 
unusually 10 to 20 percent  (Foresight, 2011, p.93). 
 
Table 7 shows that fertiliser use in sub-Saharan Africa is significantly lower than in all other 
regions, including MENA. The World Bank (2008) citing Morris et al 2007, note that on 
average farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa have to sell double the amount of grain to purchase 
one kilogram of fertiliser compared to Asian and Latin American farmers. The soil quality in 
sub-Saharan Africa has deteriorated over decades due to this lack of fertiliser use along with 
the expansion of production into less fertile land areas as population pressures have increased. 
It has been estimated that this has affected three quarters of the region‟s farmland (World 
Bank  2008,  p.55).  An  example  of  where  policy  around  land  rights  has  encouraged 
improvements in the soil quality is in Ethiopia. The strengthening of users rights resulted in 
increased investment in building terraces (Foresight 2011, p.84). 
The sub-Saharan region has a history of interventionist agricultural sector policies, however, 
there are numerous examples of misdirected policies and inefficiencies. In addition to this, 
the sector has historically been heavily taxed. When these factors are combined with the more 
frequent  occurrence  of  macroeconomic  shocks,  lower  public  investment  and  higher 
marketing costs and weak supply chains the cumulative challenges for a green revolution in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are notably higher than they were in Asia.  35 
 
Despite the difficulties facing Africa in successfully implanting a green revolution, recent 
evidence of localised successes in staple food production in sub-Saharan Africa based on 
increased fertiliser use and technology advances, particularly in maize in Malawi, Kenya, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe (World Bank 2008, p.55) suggest that there is scope for increased 
food production to be a viable strategy. However, due to the region‟s diversity there is no one 
type of green revolution that will address the region‟s food production inefficiencies and 
countries  will  have  to  find  novel  ways  to  boost  crop  and  livestock  production  to  avoid 
increasing reliance upon imports and food aid  (Foresight  2011, p.127).  Nevertheless,  the 
organisational challenges of a green revolution in sub-Saharan Africa are large, such that the 
risk  of  pursuing  a  domestic  production  strategy  in  isolation  is  great.  A  recommended 
approach would be to pursue a domestic production strategy as a primary focus, supported by 
a trade-based strategy.  
In conclusion, both MENA and sub-Saharan Africa have the potential to increase agricultural 
and food crop productivity. For both regions key policies to improve agricultural productivity 
include: more R&D in agriculture; improving availability of rural assets like land, physical 
capital, education and health; investing in rural infrastructure; improving product markets; 
improving  access  to  financial  services  and  strengthening  producer  organisations.  Rural 
poverty  is  at  the  heart  of  food  security  problems  in  both  regions  and  hence  there  is  a 
particular need to target smallholder farmers in the process of trying to raise agricultural 
productivity. However, the scope for both extensive and intensive growth in agriculture and 
food crop production is far greater in sub-Saharan Africa than in MENA, such that boosting 
domestic food crop production via a green revolution is likely to play a much greater role in 
sub-Saharan Africa‟s future food security strategy than it will in MENA. The potential for 
greater food crop production in sub-Saharan Africa is closely linked to a fourth food security 
strategy  currently in  vogue in  the MENA region, namely, land  acquisition  in  third party 
countries. This is discussed below.  
  
5.e MENA’s land acquisition overseas 
We  have  argued  above  that  both  MENA  and  sub-Saharan  Africa  will  have  to  rely  on  a 
combination of trade and domestic production to achieve future food security, with MENA 
being  particularly  dependent  on  trade.  However,  much  of  the  work  carried  out  on  food 36 
 
security in MENA was conducted before the global food price hike of 2007/08. Lofgren and 
Richards (2003) for example state that “reliance on imports of grain is made increasingly 
attractive by a long-run downward trend in world prices that is expected to continue in the 
future.”  (p. 12). We now know that this prediction was wrong. 
Following the food price hike of 2007/08 most MENA countries are beginning to reappraise 
their food security strategies. They are uncomfortable at relying on trade in international food 
markets as this makes them vulnerable to price volatility as well as to trade embargoes and 
export bans and the geo-political influences of big suppliers like USA. The fact that five 
exporters – Argentina, Australia, Canada, EU and USA - supply 73 percent of the world‟s 
traded cereals (FAO 2008) makes MENA‟s access to food highly vulnerable to events in 
these five exporters plus their relationships with these countries. For example, countries like 
Iran, Syria with poor relations with the West may fear trade embargoes. In addition, rising 
global food prices have contributed to the wave of political unrest currently sweeping the 
MENA region via their impact on domestic food prices (Harrigan 2011). 
As a result of the above factors, the issue of food security is taking on political dimensions in 
MENA. A strong concept that is emerging in the region is that of “food sovereignty” – the 
idea that nation states can have full political and economic control over their access to food. 
This is leading countries to want to reduce their reliance on food imports. We have already 
argued above that due to resource endowments the scope for MENA countries to increase 
their domestic food production in order to reduce reliance on imports is limited. In response 
to this constraint, a new innovative approach which is emerging in the region is a policy of 
acquiring land in third party countries on which to grow food for delivery to the home MENA 
country. This controversial strategy is being adopted by more and more food scarce MENA 
countries, with Arab investors buying or leasing land in poor but land and labour abundant 
countries to secure their food supply. Many of the host countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Between 2006-2010 15-20 million hectares of farmland in developing countries has been 
subject to transactions involving foreign investors, many from the MENA region (World 
Bank 2009). 
Advocates of this strategy claim it is a win-win approach: The investing MENA country gets 
guaranteed access to food and a high financial return on its investment. The poor recipient 
country gets an injection of capital into its agricultural sector promoting development and 37 
 
increasing agricultural output so that there is more for everyone. The advantages of such 
practices  for  sub-Saharan  Africa  include  the  potential  for  investment  in  agricultural 
infrastructure leading to job creation, as well as health and education investment, agricultural 
technology spill overs and in the longer term the potential for improved international food 
price stability (Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009).  
Saudi Arabia and UAE are at the forefront of this MENA initiative. They hold 2.8 million 
hectares of land mainly in Indonesia, Pakistan, Sudan and Tanzania. The Saudi‟s now plan to 
acquire a chain of 100,000 hectares of land abroad as part of their “King Abdullah initiative 
for  Saudi  agricultural  investment  abroad”  and  are  targeting  Brazil,  Indonesia  and  Sudan. 
Other agreements in place or being negotiated include: Egypt in Uganda and Sudan; Bahrain 
in Philippines; Kuwait in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; Libya in Ukraine and Zimbabwe; 
Qatar in Cambodia, Vietnam, Kenya and Sudan. For example in December 2008 Qatar took 
40,000 hectares of land in Kenya in exchange for a US$2.5 billion loan to build a deep water 
port. Pakistan is actively courting Arab investors to buy up Pakistani land in return for oil and 
finance and Sudan, the largest country in Africa with abundant water for irrigation from the 
Blue and White Nile, is also a potential target
19.  
The MENA investments in overseas land are carried out in a variety of ways. The UAE has 
used  government  investment  but  multi-national  financial  institutions  such  as  the  Arab 
Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development  (AAAID) have also been involved, 
whilst in Saudi some of the investment has been carried out by private companies such as Al-
Qudra and the Bin Laden Company  - the Saudi government often gives credit facilities or 
finance to private investors who want to buy foreign land. 
This land acquisition in third party countries to grow food for the Arab population is the 
changing face of food security in the MENA region. But it is a highly controversial strategy. 
The terms of the arrangements are often not transparent  and often favour the investor with, 
for example, tax exemptions in the host country. T here is potential for labour abuses and it 
can threaten  food security in the host countries in years of poor harvest if  the investing 
country has priority claim on food production. For example, Saudi is now receiving rice, 
wheat and barley from land they lease in Ethiopia whilst the World Food Programme spent 
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US$116 million providing 230,000 MT of food aid between 2007 and 2011 to 4.6 million 
Ethiopians  threatened  by  hunger  and  malnutrition  (South  Asia  Partnership  2011).  The 
Sudanese are planning to set aside one fifth of their cultivatable land for Arab governments 
despite the fact that it is the recipient of the largest food aid operation in the world.  
MENA‟s land acquisition strategy also has the potential to export political unrest to the host 
country as local populations loose access to land –farmers in Kenya and Pakistan have voiced 
opposition to proposed deals with Gulf countries, with Qatar for example facing an uprising 
from local farmers in Kenya who claim that the land the Qataris want to buy is theirs. There 
is also the possibility of negative externalities in the host country in that the foreign investors 
may not care about the long term environmental consequences of their actions. All these 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that many of the sub-Saharan host countries have weak 
institutions  which  often  mean  they  cannot  protect  the  rights  of  local  people  or  the 
environment. In light of these issues, the Head of the FAO, Jacques Diouf has referred to 
some of these projects as „neo-colonialist‟. 
An interesting new literature is beginning to emerge on this novel land acquisition approach 
to food security in MENA (Cotula et al 2009, IFPRI 2010a, Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009) 
and it is an area that deserves further research. Clearly, there are strong implications for sub-
Saharan Africa as a host region and food security issues in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa 
have become linked as a result of the former‟s land acquisitions in the later.   
In light of the above problems, an alternative approach to purchasing land in third party 
countries has been recommended by the World Bank (2009). The Bank has suggested that 
instead of buying land in third party countries, MENA states should just invest in the local 
infrastructure and technology needed to produce, transport and store the food and should 
secure  food  through  contract  farming  and  investment  in  rural  infrastructure  in  the  host 
country. The FAO is likewise pushing foreign investors to support joint ventures with local 
farmers rather than leasing land or buying it outright.  Qatar is  looking into this  with its 
Hassad Food Company owned by Qatar‟s sovereign wealth fund.  
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6.  Conclusions 
This paper has shown that in terms of national aggregate food security, the MENA region is 
often  portrayed  as  being  very  food  insecure  due  to  its  heavy  reliance  on  food  imports. 
However,  in  terms  of  more  meaningful  indicators  of  food  security  at  the  level  of  the 
individual,  sub-Saharan  Africa  is  much  more  food  insecure  than  MENA  as  shown  by 
indicators such as the Global Hunger Index and percentage of the population undernourished.  
Analysis of both regions shows that trade seems to be a critical factor in influencing food 
security, as is country income level. On the other hand, resource endowment does not seem to 
be correlated with food security in either region. This suggests that two factors are critical in 
influencing a country‟s food security – the ability to generate sustained (pro-poor) economic 
growth in order to raise income levels and the ability to increase the economy‟s level of trade.  
Reliance  on  foreign  trade  and  food  imports,  however,  is  only  one  of  several  possible 
strategies for achieving food security. Other strategies include recourse to food aid, domestic 
food production and land acquisition overseas. In terms of food imports, MENA is much 
more reliant on this strategy than sub-Saharan Africa due to MENA‟s ecological constraints 
on food production, although predictions suggest that both regions will become increasingly 
dependent on food imports in the future unless domestic production is increased significantly. 
Although less dependent on commercial food imports, sub-Saharan Africa has been much 
more reliant on food aid than MENA and is more reliant on intra-regional trade. 
In terms of domestic production, sub-Saharan Africa has much more potential than MENA to 
increase  food  production  through  both  extensive  and  intensive  production  increases.  In 
particular, there is potential for a significant green revolution in sub-Saharan Africa, although 
the difficulties of implementing such a revolution should not be underestimated.    
 Both regions have been adversely affected by the global food price increases of 2007/08 and 
of the first half of 2011. The upshot, particularly in MENA, has been a reappraisal of trade-
based food security strategies and a reluctance to rely on volatile international food markets. 
Whilst sub-Saharan Africa can reduce reliance on international food markets via a  green 
revolution, this option is limited in MENA. Hence MENA is turning to a new approach to 
food  security  via  land  acquisition  overseas.  This  controversial  strategy  means  that  food 40 
 
security  in  the  two  regions  is  likely  to  become  more  closely  interlinked  since  much  of 
MENA‟s land acquisition is occurring in sub-Saharan Africa.   
Whatever combination of strategies individual countries in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa 
adopt to obtain food security, there will always be a need for appropriate social safety nets to 
ensure that the poor and vulnerable have access to food. One of the three approaches to food 
security in MENA recommended by the World Bank, IFPRI and FAO (World Bank 2009) 
was to strengthen safety nets along with family planning and education, including education 
on family size and nutrition. Policies under this heading include for example, more targeted 
and flexible safety nets and food subsidies so that food price shocks are not allowed to reduce 
investment in human capital, for example by pulling children out of school.  
Lofgren  and  Richards  (2003)  likewise  argue  that  income  poverty  is  a  primary  issue  for 
household food security in MENA and that Government safety nets and poverty alleviation 
strategies  are  essential,  for  example,  targeted  food  subsidies,  public  works  programmes, 
pensions and cash transfers. They point out that between 1985 and 2000 poverty rose in most 
of the MENA region‟s middle and lower income countries.  
In sub-Saharan Africa the need for adequate social safety nets is also crucial due to the high 
incidence of poverty in the region  and high levels  of undernourishment.  In addition,  the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS also impacts negatively on food security particularly in Eastern and 
Southern parts of the region
20 (Staatz and Dembele 2008, p.13).  A full discussion of safety 
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